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MYTHS, MISCUES, AND MISCONCEPTIONS: NO-AID
SEPARATIONISM AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
CARL H. ESBECK*

In neutrality theory the recipients of vouchers, grants, and
purchase-of-service contracts are eligible to participate as providers in government social service programs without regard to their
religious character. Indeed, religious beliefs and practices are
prohibited bases for screening out those who want to be welfare
program providers. Notable examples of congressional social
service legislation conforming to the rule of religious neutrality
are the "charitable choice" feature imbedded in the Welfare
Reform Act of 19961 and the Community Services Block Grant
Act of 1998,2 as well as the provision allowing issuance of child
care vouchers to indigent parents in the Child Care and Development Block Grant Program of 1990.' Likewise, federal grants-inaid programs, for example the Church Arson Prevention Act of
1996, 4 the Telecommunication Act of 1996,' and the President's
* Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of MissouriColumbia; J.D., Cornell University, 1974; B.S., Iowa State University, 1971.
Copyright 1999. All rights reserved.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. I1 1996). Charitable choice appears as § 104
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161 (1996). The Act was signed by
President Clinton on August 22, 1996, but its most important provisions did not
become effective until July 1, 1997.
2. Pub. L. No. 105-285 §§ 201-02, 112 Stat. 2702, 2728 (1998) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Charitable choice appears as § 679
of the Community Services Block Grant Act, which is Title II of the Coats'
Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, 112 Stat.
2702 (1998). The Joint Report of the House and Senate Conference
Committee appears at 114 CONG. REc. H9697 to H9719 (daily ed. Oct. 6,1998)
(submission of Rep. Goodling).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858q (1994). The program permits faith-based
child care centers to receive child care certificates (essentially vouchers)
without regard to religion. The certificates are issued to an indigent parent
who, in turn, selects the child care provider that the parent thinks best meets
his or her needs and those of the child.
4. The Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110
Stat. 1392 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
Section 4 of the Act provides for nonprofit organizations exempt under
§ 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, who out of racial or religious
animus are victims of arson or terrorism, to obtain federally guaranteed loans
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Values-Based Violence Prevention Initiative6 to reduce youth violence and gang activity, adhere to the principle of religious
neutrality.
Various Justices on the Supreme Court have proposed all
manner of verbal formulae to encapsule the restraints of the
Establishment Clause. The most long-standing test (as well as the
most reviled) has the two-fold requirement that "there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."7 The test acquired a third prong
through private lending institutions. This means churches and other houses of
worship can obtain the necessary credit to repair or rebuild their buildings, and
can do so at reduced interest rates. The Act, quite sensibly, treats churches like
all similarly situated exempt nonprofit organizations. The secular purpose is to
assist the victims of crime. The federal loan guarantee is a form of direct aid to
religion, albeit aid neutrally available to all § 501 (c) (3) organizations.
5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Tide 47
U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 11 1996) directs the Federal Communications Commission
to implement a universal service program to make computer Internet and other
network services available in libraries and K-12 schools, including religious
schools. Under 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.500 to .516 (1998), interested schools may
apply to the FCC for grants. Successful applicants purchase available network
services from commercial vendors. A portion of the vendor's bill to the school
is discounted. The vendor is reimbursed the difference by the administrator of
a fund that is created by a tax on telephone services.
6. The Values-Based Violence Prevention Initiative was announced by
President Clinton on July 22, 1998. Remarks on Crime PreventionEfforts, 34 WKLv.
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1450 (July 24, 1998). The initiative
makes $2.2 million in grants available to civic, community, and religious
organizations in sixteen cities to facilitate the work of these organizations
among youth gangs and to enhance collaboration with local law enforcement
officials. See id. at 1415-81. The effort is modeled after the National Ten Point
Leadership Foundation in Boston, a faith-based program led by the Rev.
Eugene F. Rivers, III. Community-based and religious organizations work
closely with youth to prevent truancy, provide adult mentors, teach moral
values, and offer positive alternatives to gangs and drug abuse.
A similar initiative of the Clinton Administration has been created in the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). HUD seeks to
collaborate with community and faith-based organizations to help empower the
poor in urban centers. Although not a new funding source, the Center for
Community and Interfaith Partnerships at HUD provides information and
expertise on HUD programs, seeks input on policies and programs, and acts as
a problem solver to help overcome barriers to utilization of federal programs.
The goal is to collaborate more effectively with faith-based organizations and
others toward common development goals. See The Center for Community and
Interfaith Partnerships:About the Center (visited Mar. 4, 1999) <http://www.hud.
gov/cdcintro.html>.
7. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (holding
that school-sponsored prayer and devotional Bible reading violate the
Establishment Clause).
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in Lemon v. Kurtzman8 urging the avoidance of "excessive entanglement" between government and religion, 9 only to have entanglement analysis recently absorbed back into the primary-effect
prong.10
The Lemon test is the doctrinal formula most often resorted
to in the lower federal and state courts. But rather than a literal
application of the precise words of the two-prong test, its application calls for a nuanced interpretation of the Supreme Court's
cases decided subsequent to Lemon. Within the framework of the
test as truly applied, there is little doubt that religiously neutral
social service funding programs meet the "secular purpose"
requirement. This is because the Court's application of Lemon's
first prong is highly deferential to the legislature. 1 For example,
the purposes of the aforementioned federal programs are,
respectively, welfare assistance to the poor and needy, help for
indigent parents to pay for quality child care, assistance for the
victims of arson to rebuild following commission of a hate crime,
improving Internet access for students in K-12 schools, and
reducing gang violence among inner-city juveniles. That Congress also intended faith-based providers to be eligible to com8. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (disallowing salary supplements for private K-12
school teachers, as well as state reimbursement for the expense of instructional

materials).
9. Id. at 614-22. The three-prong Lemon test is as follows: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
10. In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), Justice O'Connor for the
majority indicated that it will be "simplest" in future applications of
Establishment Clause doctrine to consider entanglement as part of the effect
prong:
Whether a government aid program results in such an
entanglement has consistently been an aspect of our Establishment
Clause analysis. We considered entanglement both in the course of
assessing whether an aid program has an impermissible effect of
advancing religion.., and as a factor separate and apart from "effect"
....
Regardless of how we have characterized the issue, however, the
factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is "excessive" are
similar to the factors we use to examine "effect" . . . . Thus, it is
simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it-as
we did in Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)]-as an aspect of
the inquiry into a statute's effect.
Id. at 232-33 (citations omitted).
11. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1988) (stating that
legislation had a secular purpose where "on the whole, religious concerns were
not the sole motivation behind the Act").
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pete for program funding on the same criteria as12other recipients
does not alter the legislation's secular purpose.
The serious debate, however, is over the second prong of
Lemon, namely whether the "primary effect" of these social welfare initiatives is to advance religion. Although it is beyond cavil
that the ultimate beneficiaries of these social programs are the
poor and needy, the intermediate recipients of the government
funding are the welfare service providers. Most of these providers are nongovernmental, that is, they are in the independent
sector. The overwhelming number in the independent section
are not-for-profit, but a few providers are for-profit organizations.
Of the nonprofit providers, some are religious in purpose. Of
those providers that are religious, there are wide differences in
the degree of their overt spirituality or religious fervency.
No-aid separationists 3 argue that Lemon's primary-effect
inquiry should focus on whether a service provider is religious in
character and if so, how religious. They maintain that a provider
found "too religious" is to be dubbed "pervasively sectarian," and
thereby disqualified from program eligibility. In contrast, in neutrality theory14 the primary-effect inquiry is accomplished by
12.

statute

See, e.g., id. at 606-07 (citations omitted) (The "provisions of the

reflect at most

Congress'

considered judgment

that religious

organizations can help solve the problems to which the [Adolescent Family Life
Act] is addressed. Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress from
making such a judgment or from recognizing the important part that religion
or religious organizations may play in resolving certain secular problems.").
13. As the term is used here, no-aid separationists hold that most forms of
governmental assistance to religious organizations are prohibited by the
Establishment Clause. I hold to the separation of church and state and believe
that it is codified in the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, I am a
separationist. I also believe, as will become evident below, that no-aid
separationism is inconsistent with the structural separation of church and state
of the Establishment Clause and thus is misguided. The neutrality principle
with its equal treatment of all educational and social service providersincluding all faith-based providers-is, I believe, true to historic separationism.
Whereas structural separationism and neutrality are in harmony, see Douglas
Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43
(1997), neutrality and no-aid separationism are at odds.
Neutrality theory should not be confused with "accomodationism," a
theory more consistent with the results in cases upholding legislative prayer, see,
e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and municipal-sponsored
Christmas nativity scenes, see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Nor
should neutrality be confused with "nonpreferentialism," a theory articulated in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), but never
adopted by the Supreme Court in any of its cases. I believe that both
accomodationism and nonpreferentialism are also misguided.
14. I make no claim that a rule of religious neutrality is substantively
neutral, hence, the term "neutrality principle" (or simply "neutrality") is
perhaps better described as a rule of "equal treatment," "nondiscrimination," or
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examining how a service provider actually spends the federal program monies. The monies are to be spent only for the purposes
set out in the service contract or grant. These purposes-having
already satisfied Lemon's secular-purpose prong-necessarily
exclude use 15 of the monies for inherently religious
programming.

The "too religious" versus "secular enough" inquiry insisted
upon by no-aid separationists is hopelessly unconstitutional, as
will be elaborated upon below. But first, discussion is warranted
uncovering no-aid separationism's false assumption about modem American society.
I.

THE THEORY OF No-AID SEPARATIONISM Is No LONGER
PLAUSIBLE; INDEED, IN ITS MODERN SETTING IT IS

HOSTILE TO INDIVIDUAL

RELIGIOUS CHOICE

Two hundred years ago, when the Republic was small and
most acts of public charity took place in the independent sector,
no-aid separationism was a plausible ordering of American society. In the decades immediately following the nation's founding,
religious organizations were deeply involved in social welfare
activities and at the same time largely avoided contact with institutions of government. For government (federal, state and
local) to eschew involvement with religious organizations was not
a matter of indifference, discrimination, or hostility. Rather,
because government likewise had little to do with secular organizations, it was a matter of evenhandedness to have little to do
with faith-based organizations. Government left charity to the
independent sector. Government was small, and organized charity was mostly religious and privately funded.
This no-aid separationism of the eighteenth century can
continue to be applied to conditions at the end of the twentieth
century only by clinging to the myth that the modern nation-state
exercises limited control over the resources available for devotion to the social welfare needs of Americans. 6 Holding to this
myth, no-aid separationists insist it is fair to ask religious citizens
"evenhandedness." Nonetheless, the Justices of the Supreme Court are using
the term "neutrality principle" and variations thereof, so I will follow their lead.
15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604aoj) (Supp. 111996), a provision in "charitable
choice" expressly prohibiting service contract monies from being "expended
for sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization." Monies from
nongovernmental sources may, of course, be spent at a provider's discretion,
including being spent on programming that is inherently religious.
16. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
DoctrinalDevelopment: PartII. The NonestablishmentPrinciple,81 HARv. L. REv. 513,
522-26 (1968).
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to support their faith-based charities via sacrificial giving and to
also pay taxes for the support of the secular providers now receiving substantial government funding.
Reality, of course, is that "big government," with its high
taxes and pervasive regulation, has a near monopoly over the
resources available for social welfare spending. With the advent
of the welfare/regulatory state in the middle third of this century, continuing to enforce a strict rule of no aid has the effect of
confining religious social ministries to ever smaller enclaves of
private life. If the charities of faith-based groups are to participate along with secular organizations in meaningfully serving
civil society, they are put to a cruel choice. No-aid separationism
demands that religious ministries either secularize and thereby
qualify for government aid, or close their doors for lack of funding. Thus, in its present-day impact, no-aid separationism is hostile toward faith-based charities. The changed circumstances
work such unfairness that denial of all aid is no longer a plausible
ordering of church/state relations. The absence of evenhandedness not only suffocates social and religious pluralism by creating
a monolithic, secular-dominated structure for the delivery of welfare services, but the no-aid view eliminates a fuller range of provider choices for the poor and needy.
Since Widmar v. Vincent,1 7 the general trajectory of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause cases has moved away
from no-aid separationism and toward the neutrality principle.' 8
The Court's most recent pronouncements addressing the issue

17. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down as violative of the Free Speech
Clause a state university's discriminatory restrictions on religious groups
meeting in classrooms and other campus buildings).
18. I have discussed elsewhere the evolution of the law away from no-aid
separationism and in the direction of neutrality theory. See Carl H. Esbeck, A
Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service
Providers, 46 EMORy L.J. 1, 20-39 (1997). Several scholars have traversed the
same ground and concluded that the Court's march, however tentative, is in the
direction of neutrality. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religion ClauseAnti-Theories, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 703-07 (1997); John H. Garvey, What's Next After
Separationism?, 46 EMORy L.J. 75 (1997); Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change
in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century,
80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1089-94 (1996); Laycock, supra note 13, at 45-46; Ira C.
Lupu, To ControlFactionand ProtectLiberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses,

7 J.

CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES

357, 364-66, 369, 371-73 (1996); Michael W.

McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 175-94
(1992); Michael S. Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited
Public Forum: UnconstitutionalConditions on "EqualAccess"for Religious Speakers and
Groups, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 653, 710-17 (1996).
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are Agostini v. Felton19 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.2" Although the Agostini and Rosenberger
majorities did not embrace the neutrality principle without qualification, the law today is far closer to neutrality than to the no-aid
separationism of the 1970s and mid-1980s. The Agostini Court,
for example, was no longer willing to assume that direct aid to
religious schools would be diverted to the inculcation of religion
by authorities at Roman Catholic K-12 schools.2 ' Agostini upheld
assistance to "pervasively sectarian" schools provided that the
overall program was religiously neutral. Additionally, because
the aid was conveyed directly to service providers, the Agostini
Court required sufficient regulatory controls so that officials
could be assured that the assistance was not misdirected.2 2 In
Agostini, the Court found additional safeguards in the form of
the aid (government employees providing remedial educational
services) and in the administrative oversight that attended the
delivery of the aid (unannounced inspections by supervisors).
Because the Court discourages facial challenges to comprehensive spending programs, 23 future challengers to neutral social
service programs will have to introduce evidence that proves
inherently religious beliefs or practices are actually being
advanced with the use of program monies.

19. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding federal education program where
government employees deliver remedial services to students at the campus of
the students' primary or secondary school, including religious schools deemed
"pervasively sectarian").
20. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding university's denial of funding for
printing of student newspaper, because of paper's religious viewpoint, was
discrimination contrary to Free Speech Clause).
21. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
22. See id. at 222-36. The law has never been that direct funding of
"pervasively sectarian" providers is per se violative of the Establishment Clause.
That would be a rule of form over substance, and the Supreme Court long ago
rejected such formalism. For example, in Committeefor PublicEducation v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646 (1980), the Court upheld direct cash payments to religious K-12
schools, explaining, "[w]e decline to embrace a formalistic dichotomy that
bears so little relationship either to common sense or the realities of school
finance. None of our cases requires us to invalidate these reimbursements
simply because they involve [direct] payments in cash." Id. at 658.
23. See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,
2175 (1998) (quotations and citations omitted) ("Facial invalidation is,
manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and
only as a last resort."). Accordingly, lawsuits over religiously neutral programs
will likely have to be provider-specific (or "as applied") challenges to particular
contract awards.
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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PERVASIVELY AND NON-PERVASIVELY
SECTARIAN PROVIDERS IS ITSELF VIOLATIVE OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S CASE LAW

No-aid separationists concede that the Supreme Court's
cases permit direct funding of faith-based social service provid-

ers, but only so long as the providers are not "pervasively sectarian."24 The daunting task of screening out "pervasively sectarian"
providers means that state officials will have to apply a religious
test to all religiously affiliated providers, culling those eventually
determined to be "too religious." Merely to draw the "pervasively
sectarian" distinction,

however, requires state

social service

bureaucracies-and ultimately the courts-to probe into the
nature and practices of religious charities and to attribute meaning to their beliefs, words, and actions. Such inquiries into the
significance of religious tenets and observances violates the most
fundamental aim of church/state separation, which is to keep
these two centers of authority-God and Caesar,
so to speak25
within their respective spheres of competence.
24. The principal case on which no-aid separationists rely is Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). It is ironic that no-aid separationists fought
vigorously against the result in Kendrick, but now they cling to it. What was a
loss for them in 1988 is today the best they can do when pressed to marshal
their authorities. But that just goes to show that in the 1990s the Supreme
Court has been moving away from no-aid separationism and toward neutrality.
It is a freeze-frame view of constitutional doctrine to argue, as no-aid
separationists do, that the Kendrick majority states the law of the Establishment
Clause today. Kendrick was a great victory for religious liberty in 1988, for the
case was a rejection of no-aid separationism. That Kendrick did not embrace
neutrality in 1988 is not a deterrent to the Court's strides to do so a decade
later. The rule of no-direct-aid to "pervasively sectarian" organizationssuccessfully evaded by the Court majority in Kendrick so as to facially uphold
congressional funding-began to break down with Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
ScoolDistrict,509 U.S. 1 (1993), and Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), and has totally unraveled with Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997) ("We have departed from the rule relied on in [Grand
Rapids v.] Ball that all government aid that directly aids the educational
function of religious schools is invalid.").
No-aid separationists argue that Kendrick is controlling because it is the last
Supreme Court case to deal with social services. This makes no sense. The
Supreme Court does not have "school cases" and "social service" cases. Rather,
the Supreme Court has Establishment Clause cases. So one must look to the
Court's latest word on what the Establishment Clause means. That is why the
three cases in the 1990s (Zobrest, Rosenberger, and Agostini) supersede cases from
the 1980s (such as Kendrick).
25. William Clancy aptly frames the constitutional settlement embodied
in the Establishment Clause this way:
[T]ihe "wall of separation" metaphor is an unfortunate and inexact
description of the American Church-State situation. What we have
constitutionally is not a "wall" but a logical distinction between two
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To be "pervasively sectarian," explained a much earlier
Supreme Court, means that a faith-based provider's "secular
activities cannot be separated from [its] sectarian ones." 26 This,
of course, just rephrases the question. Now the test requires government officials to ask what is "secular" and what is "sectarian"
about each specific provider, and when are the two so blended
that the "secular alone" cannot be separately funded. Further
complicating the matter, this inquiry is to operate in the context
of a wide variety of government-supported social services 27 and in
the face of a broad and complex diversity of methodologies
employed by these independent sector providers.
The Supreme Court has refused to permit state bureaucracies to probe into the meaning ("secular" versus "sectarian") of a
religious organization's words, practices, and events. 28 A parallel
orders of competence. Caesar recognizes that he is only Caesar and
forswears any attempt to demand what is God's. (Surely this is one of
history's more encouraging examples of secular modesty.) The State
realistically admits that there are severe limits on its authority and
leaves the churches free to perform their work in society.
William Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY
23, 27-28 (1958).
26. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
27. A list of types of social service providers would include community
development organizations, preschools, and child day care centers; temporary
shelters for abused children; foster homes and adoption placement agencies;
residential care or group care homes for abused or neglected children and
adjudicated juvenile bffenders; adolescent or teen counseling centers; crisis
pregnancy .counseling centers; maternity homes for women -with crisis
pregnancies; temporary shelters for battered women; rehabilitation centers for
alcoholics, drug abusers, and the unemployed; AIDS hospices; prison
ministries, police and prison chaplaincies; halfway houses for adults convicted
of crimes; storehouses of free (or reduced-price) food, used clothing, and
household items; centers for free meals (soup kitchens) and temporary shelters
for the homeless (rescue missions); low-income housing renovation programs;
refugee aid and resettlement; disaster relief; clearinghouses for volunteers
rendering home-based care to the disabled; long-term care facilities for the
disabled, retarded, and mentally ill; long-term care facilities for the elderly
(retirement, nursing, and invalid homes); elderly day care centers; centers for
vocational training or employment of the disabled; literacy and English-as-asecond-language programs; hospitals and community health clinics; dispute
resolution and legal aid centers; abstinence counseling centers for teenagers;
financial counseling centers; marital and family counseling centers;
recreational programs, summer camps, and retreat centers for youth and
adults; and, support groups of every stripe for persons suffering from life's
many vicissitudes.
28. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
844-45 (1995) (cautioning state university to avoid having to distinguish
between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression of ideas merely
approved by a given religion); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church
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concern over restraining governmental power is behind the
Supreme Court's determination that it lacks subject matter juris29
diction over disputes internal to an ecclesiastical organization.
This jurisdictional bar to deciding intrachurch issues is not limited to conflicts implicating ownership of church real estate. The
bar extends as well to all civil and criminal litigation whenever a
dispute turns on matters that are inherently religious, including
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987)
(recognizing a problem when government attempts to divine which
ecclesiastical appointments are sufficiently related to the "core" of a religious
organization to merit exemption from statutory duties); id. at 344-45 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (same); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30
(1983) (avoiding potentially entangling inquiry into religious practice is
desirable); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 n.6, 272 n.11 (1981)
(holding that inquiries into significance of religious words or events are to be
avoided); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (holding that it is
desirable to avoid entanglement that would follow should tax authorities
evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare programs); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (noting that petty officials are not to
be given discretion to determine what is a legitimate "religion" for purposes of
issuing permit); see also Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (mem.), affg 634
F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that
required officials to distinguish between "spiritual" and secular purposes
underlying solicitation by religious organizations); United States v. Christian
Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561, 564-65 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that IRS
could not appeal directly to Supreme Court the ruling of a federal district court
to the effect that the IRS's redetermination of § 501(c) (3) exempt status was
done in a manner violative of rights of admittedly religious organization; IRS
had sought to examine all of religious organization's activities and characterize
them as either "religious" or "political" and, if political, then "non-religious").
29. Concerning disputes over doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, the selection
or promotion of clerics, and dismissal from church membership, the Supreme
Court has said that civil courts are without subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-24 (1976) (civil
courts may not probe into church polity); Maryland & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per
curiam) (desiring to avoid doctrinal disputes); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969)
(indicating civil courts forbidden to interpret and weigh church doctrine);
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per curiam)
(indicating that the First Amendment prevents judiciary, as well as legislature,
from interfering in ecclesiastical governance of Russian Orthodox Church);
Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952) (noting that the First
Amendment prevents legislature from interfering in ecclesiastical governance
of Russian Orthodox Church); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725-33
(1872) (rejecting implied trust rule because of its departure-from-doctrine
inquiry). These subject matter jurisdiction dismissals do not reference Article
III of the Constitution, for there is nothing in Article III that limits federal court
jurisdiction concerning these matters. Rather, the cases reference the
Establishment Clause and the necessity for keeping at a proper distance the
institutions of church and state.
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civil rights employment legislation, 32 and

fraud. 3

criminal
The Court has similarly held that legislative classifications
based on denominational affiliation are not constitutionally permitted.3 4 The Court wants to avoid making church membership
of legal significance for two reasons. First, membership, as well
as denial of or removal from membership, are inherently religious decisions. Second, if this was not the rule of law, then
merely holding religious membership could result in a civic
30. See, e.g., Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp.
1286 (D. Minn. 1993) (dismissing defamation action against church where the
offensive statements arose out of church controversy); Downs v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 810-12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (holding
that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defamation claim against
church hierarchy); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (dismissing
claim against Roman Catholic Diocese for negligent supervision of priest);
Tidman v. Salvation Army, No. 01-A-01-9708-CV00380, 1998 WL 391765, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 1998) (dismissing privacy and outrageous conduct tort
claims brought by former employee of faith-based organization discharged for
having extramarital affair); Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
precluded recovery for tort of outrage); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 44041 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited negligent
supervision claim).
31. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640
N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that breach of contract complaint was
properly dismissed on First Amendment grounds since the matter of whether to
employ plaintiff as a parochial school teacher was an ecclesiastical issue into
which civil court may not inquire); Basich v. Board of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that First Amendment prevented district court
from exercising jurisdiction over action for breach of pension contract and
breach of fiduciary duty); Pearson v. Church of God, 458 S.E.2d 68, 71 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that trial court did not have constitutional authority to
decide claim for breach of contract).
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464-65 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (finding EEOC investigation into Catholic nun's gender discrimination
Title VII claim was barred by Establishment Clause); Himaka v. Buddhist
Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698, 707-09 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that
minister's Title VII retaliation claim should be dismissed based upon excessive
governmental entanglement with religion in violation of Establishment Clause);
Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1130-32 (Colo. 1996) (holding that
Establishment Clause insulated a religious institution's choice of minister from
judicial review; Title VII claim against church was properly dismissed); Geraci v.
Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 399-400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (gender
discrimination claim against church is barred by Establishment Clause).
33. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (indicating that in
trial for mail fraud, the truth or falsity of a religious belief or profession of faith
may not be subject to scrutiny by a jury).
34. See Kiryas Joel Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-51 (1971); cf Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (distinguishing and explaining Gillette).
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advantage. 35 Judge-made classifications along the lines of pervasively and non-pervasively sectarian are no less hazardous, for the
inevitable result is that theologically liberal providers of social
services will be deemed "secular enough" and thus funded,
whereas religiously conservative providers will be found "too religious" and thus funding denied. 6 A more theologically discriminatory rule could hardly be devised.
The foregoing are Establishment Clause cases. Ancillary to
deciding free exercise cases, the Supreme Court has likewise
held that a religious belief or practice need not be central to
35. If Congress were to confer conscientious objector draft status "on all
Quakers," that may induce conversions (real or pseudo) to Quakerism. On the
other hand, the government purposefully may utilize classifications based on a
person's religious belief or practice-as distinct from denominational
affiliation-to lift civil burdens from those individuals. For example, Congress
may confer conscientious objector draft status "on religious pacifists who
oppose war in any form." See Grunmet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 448-60.
This is consistent with the rule that government can either treat all alike, not
concerning itself with unintended effects, or government can purposefully lift
civic burdens from individuals based on their religious practices. What is
impermissible is to lift such burdens based on an individual's denominational
or religious affiliation.
36. Meaningful denominational divisions are no longer along the old
alignments of Protestant versus Catholic versus Jewish. The realignment is now
orthodox (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) versus progressive (Protestant,
Catholic, and Jewish). SeeJAMEs D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE SmUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA 42-46 (1991). Professor Hunter, a sociologist of religion, has
identified the pervasively sectarian groups as "orthodox," and the theologically
liberal groups as religious "progressives." Hunter explains that the religiously
orthodox are devoted "to an essential, definable, and transcendent authority,"
whereas progressives "resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing
assumptions of contemporary life." Religious organizations most willing to
conform to contemporary culture will appear to the government as less
sectarian. Conversely, those organizations more conservative in theology and
that have resisted acculturation will inevitably appear to civil courts as more
sectarian. To exclude from government programs those groups that are more
sectarian is to punish those religions that resist conformity to culture while
favoring those religions willing to secularize. Hence, the "pervasively sectarian"
test is discriminatory against the religiously orthodox.
The Establishment Clause was included in the Bill of Rights partly because
in the newly formed states (where there were still many church establishments)
the legislators were forever intervening with their own view of "good" as
opposed to "sectarian" religion. The authors of the Establishment Clause did
not want the newly formed federal government to have the power to also
oversee religion in this way. Such interventions did more harm than good:
harm to both the civil state and to genuine religion. We do not honor such a
clause by a "pervasively sectarian" test that forces the government (welfare
administrators and eventually the courts) to award some religions and
discourage others.
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(and therefore more important to) a claimant's faith as a prerequisite to receiving the protection of the clause.37 This is because
civil magistrates are not competent to decide which practices are
at the "core" of a given religion and which are peripheral to its
faithful practice. Moreover, the Court has said that a religious
claimant may disagree with co-religionists, or be unsure or wavering, and still receive full free exercise protection.3 8 This is
because a civil magistrate has no judicially intelligible means for
gauging the relative degree of a claimant's religious fervency.
State welfare officials trying to administer the "pervasively sectarian" test will face the same difficulties.
The problem illustrated by these cases is not that government officials are, without more, interacting with religious organizations. Some regulatory interaction between government and
religious associations is inevitable, more so as government has
gotten bigger and society more complex. Thus, the argument is
not that governmental factfinding into religious matters is in
some sense an invasion of ecclesiastical "privacy" or freedom of
association, or that the net increase in administrative probing
will "entangle" government with faith-based providers beyond
some threshold thought "excessive." Rather, the problem is that
the government is being asked to adjudicate matters beyond its
constitutional competence, that is, those subject matters reserved
for the realm of religion. That explains why the Supreme Court
states the foregoing rules, not as an individual right to free exercise, but in terms of the civil courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction: "[I] t is not within the judicial function and judicial
competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their com37. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) ('Judging
the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims."); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-51, 457-58
(1988) (rejecting Free Exercise Clause test that "depend[s] on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (rejecting
government's argument that free exercise claim does not lie unless "payment of
social security taxes will . . . threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief
or observance").
This rule was recently reaffirmed in City of Boerne v. Hores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), as explaining, in part, the decision in Smith. The compelling-interest
balancing test, abandoned in Smith, was thought to require ajudge to weigh the
importance of a religious practice against a state's interest in applying a neutral
law without any exceptions for religious burdens.
38. S'ee Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ("Courts are
not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.").
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mon faith." 9 The problem of exceeding limited delegated powers arises when government is called on to weigh doctrinal
questions or to otherwise intrude into that sphere of inherently
religious matters reserved to religion and religious organizations.
The "pervasively sectarian" test requires administrative discovery into the self-understanding, creed, ecclesiology (form of
polity), missionary vision, charitable motivation, and other
beliefs and activities of the "too fervent" providers and differentiating them from the "secular enough" providers. Government
simply is not competent to scour the organic documents and mission statements of a faith-based provider and place its own gloss
on what those documents mean. Such bureaucratic rummagings
will unmask all manner of ecclesiastical "facts" over which social
service personnel will be the first to admit they have no training,
no experience, and no theological insight. The possibilities for
misunderstandings, spiritual insensitivity, and outright sectarian
bigotry wrought by the "pervasively sectarian" test is breathtaking. Bureaucratic divining into the "pervasively sectarian" question will trample any notion that God and Caesar must stay-for
the benefit of both-within their respective spheres.
Unlike no-aid separationism, neutrality in program funding
avoids the problem of lack of competency by placing the focus
on how the government aid is actually spent.40 In this manner,
39. Id. at 716. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 887; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58;
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
616-17 (1992) (Souter,J., concurring) (rejecting nonpreferentialism because its
application "invite [s] the courts to engage in comparative theology"); County of
Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (courts are "ill
equipped to sit as a national theology board").
Each of these Court-made rules of law is far easier to explain when
attributed to the restraints of constitutional structure (i.e., the Establishment
Clause) than to individual religious rights (i.e., the Free Exercise Clause).
Indeed, in some cases it is the religious rights claimant inviting the Court to
make the inquiry into religious doctrine and it is the Court refusing to do so.
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983)
(avoiding entangling inquiry). Thus, the rule applied could not be vindicating
a free exercise right. Any such right could be waived by the claimant. But if the
operative rule of law is a constitutional limit on the Court's power, then the
objection to judicial inquiry into religious doctrine cannot be waived. It can be
inferred, therefore, that the rule of law in these cases is a structural restraint on
the government's power set down by the Establishment Clause.
40. What a faith-based provider (indeed, any provider) may not do is use
government-source monies to pay for programming that is inherently religious.
But such programming is, in any event, outside the scope of the secular
purpose of the government's social service program. Inherently religious
programming may be separately provided by a faith-based provider, but only if
paid for by monies from a nongovernmental source.
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the government keeps its eye on whether the poor and needy are
actually being helped and thus whether the secular purpose of
the program is being fulfilled.4 ' Neutrality also empowers the
ultimate beneficiaries (the poor and needy) by offering them a
broader choice of welfare providers, including the choice of a
faith-based provider.
The Supreme Court's "pervasively sectarian" test was misconceived from the outset.4 2 No-aid separationists carry a heavy burden if they persist in asserting the test's applicability to neutral
social service programming.4 3 It should be rejected by the pres41. Although still in its early stages, the available empirical evidence
indicates that faith-based social service providers are more effective than their
secular counterparts. SeeJohn J. Dilulio, Jr., Jeremiah's Call, PRISM, March/April
1998, at 19 (summarizing early findings of social science studies). Yet, the
"pervasively sectarian" test requires that government ignore these "bottom line"

successes entirely. A result that so promotes ineffective policy choices over
effective policy directions ought to give the courts additional reason to question
the validity of the "pervasively sectarian" test.
42. The "pervasively sectarian" test first surfaced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971). The last case where the Court struck down governmental
aid using the test was Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
However, Ball was recently discredited and partly overruled in Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 219-23 (1997). Therefore, the last occasion for the Court to apply
the "pervasively sectarian" test that is still good law today was New York v.
Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). That means that the period of
dominance of the "pervasively sectarian" test was a mere six years (1971 to
1977), and that period is now over twenty years past.
43. The aforementioned neutral funding programs (see supra notes 1-6)
are actions of the federal government. In the 210-year history of the Supreme
Court, the Court has never struck down a federal regulation or found the
actions of a federal official violative of the Establishment Clause, and only once
has the Court held that an act of Congress violated the Establishment Clause.
See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). However, the result in Aguilar was
expressly overruled in Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Accordingly, the Court has
never held, in the final analysis, an act of Congress violative of the
Establishment Clause. Therefore, a claim that an act of Congress is violative of
the Establishment Clause is going against the weight of history. Moreover, the
Court has never struck down a governmental funding program, state or federal,
as violative of the Establishment Clause where the program was directed to the
needs of social services, health care, or higher education. Such has occurred
only with respect to state programs directed to the needs of K-12 schooling. See,
e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Prior to the Court's ruling in
Lemon, aid to K-12 religious schools was consistently upheld. See Central Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding loan of secular textbooks to
parents of school-age children, including children attending religious schools);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state law providing
reimbursement to parents for expense of transporting children by bus to
school, including parochial schools); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370 (1930) (upholding state loans of textbooks to parents with
students enrolled in school, whether public, private nonsectarian, or religious).
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ent Supreme Court at the next opportunity if the Court hopes to
bring coherence and consistency to Establishment Clause
doctrine.
III.

ARGUMENTS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONFLCTS

WITH AND OVERRIDES BOTH THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE AND

THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE MAKE

No SENSE

The exclusion of certain faith-based social service providers

from program eligibility simply because of what they believe, or
because of how they practice and express what they believe, is
discriminatory on the bases of religious speech and religious
exercise. Such intentional discrimination is prima facie violative
of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. No-aid separationists, however, insist such discrimination is required by the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, no-aid separationists posit a clash
between the clauses internal to the First Amendment, with the
Establishment Clause overriding free speech and free exercise
rights. The neutrality principle, however, sensibly posits that
these three clauses be read in harmony.
During the 1980s and 1990s, in an unbroken line of victories
for freedom of speech, the Supreme Court held that religious
expression by individuals and religious organizations was entitled
to the same high protection accorded nonreligious expression
(e.g., speech of political, artistic, or educational content)."

No-

aid separationists framed their contention as a clash of two First
Amendment clauses: a right under the Free Speech Clause to
freedom of religious expression without discrimination versus an
Establishment Clause right to a government which does not aid
religion (the aid taking the form of the use of government property to convey a religious message). With the issue so framed, noaid separationists invited the Court to "balance" the conflicting
clauses hoping to tip the scale in the direction of their bias for a
public square denuded of all religion. They lost. However, as
no-aid separationists had urged, the Court did frame the issue in

such a way that Establishment Clause compliance could, in the44. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (finding viewpoint discrimination in university's denial of printing costs
for student-initiated religious publication); Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (finding content-based discrimination
against religious speech in public forum not justified by Establishment Clause);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(finding viewpoint discrimination); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(finding content discrimination); see also Westside Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding Equal Access Act, legislation that prohibits
discrimination against religious speech at public secondary schools).

1999]

NO-AID SEPARA TIONISM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

301

ory at least, supply a compelling interest for overriding the Free
Speech Clause.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette4 is a recent
illustration of the Supreme Court's framing of the issue in a manner that erroneously creates this tension between the Free
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause. In Pinette, the State
of Ohio created a public forum in a park by allowing citizens to
erect temporary displays symbolizing their groups' message. But
when the Ku Klux Klan sought permission to erect a Latin cross
during the Christmas season, state officials balked. The Klan
then sued for impairment of its free speech rights and ultimately
won.
The PinetteCourt held that the Establishment Clause was not
violated by the presence of the Latin cross in the park. Accordingly, the state was ordered to permit the religious display on the
same basis as all other displays allowed in the park. However, in
the course of holding that private religious speech is protected
by the Free Speech Clause from content and viewpoint discrimination, the Court indicated that on different facts the Establishment Clause could require suppressing the private speech.4 6
This makes no sense. There is nothing in the text of the First
Amendment that suggests that when these clauses ostensibly conflict, the Establishment Clause supersedes the Free .Speech
Clause.4 7 One could just as arbitrarily assume that the Free
Speech Clause preempts the Establishment Clause. What the
Court ought to conclude from this apparent tension is that it has
miscued when interpreting one or both clauses.48
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits intentional discrimination against religion, as well as against religious belief and prac45.

515 U.S. 753 (1995).

46. See id. at 761-62; id. at 783 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
47. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,
484 (1982) ("[W]e know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy
of constitutional values.").
48. The clauses-in-conflict problem goes away when the Establishment
Clause is conceptualized as a structural restraint on government power. If the
speaker is private rather than governmental, then the Free Speech Clause
supplies a fight of equal access to the forum and the expression cannot be
suppressed simply because it is religious. There is never any "tension" with the
Establishment Clause, real or apparent, for that clause is a restraint on
government rather than private actors. Hence, the task in cases like Pinetteis to
first determine if the speaker is private or governmental. If private, then the
Establishment Clause is irrelevant. If the speaker is governmental, then the
individual-rights orientation of the Free Speech Clause is irrelevant. One First
Amendment clause never need be "balanced" against the other.
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tice.4 9 Yet the "pervasively sectarian" test necessarily causes state
welfare bureaucracies to discriminate against 5" the religious
beliefs and practices of providers dubbed "pervasively sectarian."
Such discrimination puts tremendous pressure on these providers to compromise their spirituality so as not to lose program
opportunities.51 "The current system makes government grant
programs relentless engines of secularization."5 2 This reduces
the variety of providers, destroying innovation and pluralism.
The secularization will, in turn, render some providers willing to
water down their programs causing them to become little different from the ineffectual state-operated programs. This is ironic,
for it was the search for more effective programs that caused government to look to voluntary sector programs in the first place.
No-aid separationists also put the Free Exercise Clause at
war with the Establishment Clause when they seek to deny "pervasively sectarian" providers the same program eligibility opportunities as other independent sector providers.5 3 Once again, they
49. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (city ordinance regulating ritual sacrifice of animals was
intentionally discriminatory); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990) (not rejecting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), insofar as Sherbert
held that whenever government makes individualized determinations, officials
must not purposefully discriminate against claims of religious exemption);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down a law disqualifying clergy
from holding public office). When the government's discrimination is
intentional, no substantial burden on religion need be shown by the religious
claimant. See Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994)
(refusing to apply substantial-burden requirement "to non-neutral government
action [because such] would make petty harassment of religious institutions...
immune from the protection of the First Amendment").
50. Use of the word "against" is intentional. As Church of Lukumi
indicated, the government cannot intentionally favor secular activity over
religious activity. However, in certain situations government can refrain from
burdening religious activity when secular groups are being burdened. See infra
notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
51. See CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBiGuous EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND
FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (forthcoming 1999); STEPHEN V.
MONSMA,WHEN SACRED & SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
& PUBLIC MONEY 109-46 (1996).
52. Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious Discrimination,in
EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 48 (Stephen V.
Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998).
53. Additional cases demonstrate this needless clauses-in-conflict
problem. See, e.g., Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 1998)
(affirming lower court's ruling that both Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses
are violated by Minnesota regulation that provided aid to special education
students unless the student was enrolled in a religious school; the regulation
was purposefully discriminatory on the basis of religion and found not required
by the Establishment Clause); Hartman v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995)
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do so by arguing clauses-in-conflict and that the no-establishment
principle should override free exercise. The argument would
have our nation's founding generation drafting a constitutional
amendment that contradicts itself. This imagined conflict is
brought about by conceptualizing the Establishment Clause as
securing a freedom from religion, and the Free Exercise Clause
doubtlessly secures some right to exercise religion. With the
issue so framed, then of course the two clauses will be on a collision course.5 4 The resulting "conflict," no-aid separationists propose, is to be relieved by tipping the "balance" in the direction of
their view of the Establishment Clause. Again, this makes no
sense. It is neither consistent with the First Amendment's text
(neither clause has primacy over the other), nor are such conflicts intrinsic to the religion clauses and thereby logically
unavoidable.5 5
(striking down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a U.S. Army regulation
that extended benefits to secular day care centers but discriminated against
faith-based centers chosen by the parents; the government's discrimination was
found not required by the Establishment Clause).
54. Alexander Meiklejohn notes the analytical difficulty when a single
constitutional clause tries to do service as both protecting personal religious
liberty and affording a freedom from religion: "[A] 11 discussions of the First
Amendment are tormented by the fact that the term 'freedom of religion' must
be used to cover 'freedom of nonreligion' as well. Such a paradoxical usage
cannot fail to cause serious difficulties, both theoretical and practical."
Alexander Meiklejohn, EducationalCooperation Between Church and State, 14 LAw
& CONTEMP. PRoBs. 61, 71 (1949).
55. The analytics of the problem still leads a few academics into thinking
that the "conflict" between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is
inherent and irreconcilable. See, e.g.,
Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox
Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 123-25, 129-30. However, when "freedom from
religion" is removed as an individual right under the First Amendment, the
"tension" falls away. Such a move does not leave "freedom from religion"
without constitutional protection. It does mean, however, that to the extent
that the First Amendment protects a "freedom from religion," it does so as a byproduct of the structural restraint on governmental power found in the
Establishment Clause.
Proper relations between religion and government (or "church and state")
make of the Establishment Clause a structural restraint on government power.
The clause is in the role of a boundary keeper. In setting out to locate that
boundary, it is a useful reminder that the "keeper's" task is to restrain
government-not private individuals, not churches, and not religion. Thus the
task of the Establishment Clause is not to protect people from other people.
Nor is it to protect minority religions from majority religions. Nor is it to
protect the nonreligious from the religious. Nor is it to protect the government
from the church. Rather, the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to limit
government, including any decisions by the government to improperly ally with
religion.
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The Establishment Clause understood as embodying the
neutrality principle eliminates these ersatz conflicts among the
clauses of the First Amendment. By not intentionally discriminating against "pervasively sectarian" providers, the Free Speech
Clause is no longer in tension with the no-establishment principle. Similarly, when social service programs are neutral in relation to religion, the Free Exercise Clause is no longer in conflict
with the Establishment Clause. Achieving harmony among these
three clauses is, without more, a strong commendation for the
neutrality principle.
IV.

ENTANGLEMENT ANALYSIS MASKS WHAT Is REALLY AN
INQUIRY CONCERNING GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION INTO
INHERENTLY RELIGIOUS MATrERS

As previously noted, the second prong of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause test requires that the "primary
effect" of a law not be the advancement of religion. The test first
acquired a third prong in 1971 called "excessive entanglement,"56 only to have entanglement analysis recently absorbed
back into the effect prong.5 7 Although entanglement is once
again just a factor to consider as part of the overall primary-effect
inquiry, the Court has never said that such analysis is to be abandoned altogether. Thus, this Part addresses what is really going
on with the Court's inquiry into administrative entanglement.
Entanglement analysis appears to be wildly uneven, strictly
scrutinized by the Supreme Court on some occasions5 8 while
receiving only summary review on others.59 Clearly these cases
are not turning on the aggregate number of administrative contacts with religion, or even on the intensity of such contacts.
Rather, the Court appears to alter its entanglement analysis to
reach results based on whether the regulatory intrusion is (or is
not) into matters that are inherently religious. Before showing
how this is borne out in the cases, I note the inevitability of some
regulatory oversight by government in the context of social service programs.
Whenever government appropriates tax monies, it has a
duty to reasonably account for how the funds are utilized. Regulatory controls that "trace" funds appropriated under social ser56.
57.
58.

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
See supra note 10.
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-14 (1985); Lemon, 403

U.S. at 614-22.
59. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985).
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vice programs via purchase-of-service contracts, grants, or
vouchers are entirely proper in order that the monies actually
benefit the poor and needy as intended. The required accounting should be evenhanded for all providers, whether religious or
secular, so that no class of providers is singled out for heightened
scrutiny. For faith-based providers, it is especially important that
the fiscal controls be restricted to a focus on how the government funds are actually spent. Such "tracing" of funds will result
in some interaction between government administrators and
faith-based organizations. These resulting interactions, however,
are not violative of the Establishment Clause so long as the regulations do not intrude into inherently religious matters.
The Supreme Court's inquiry into administrative entanglement is asking the wrong question. In a modern, complex
nation with pervasive regulation and massive subsidization of the
independent social service sector, some interaction between government and religion is inevitable, often useful, and sometimes
in the interest of both. Even in the absence of government funding, the state can and does impose reasonable regulation on the
educational and charitable activities of religious organizations.6"
If entanglement vel non was the real concern of the Supreme
Court, there would be entanglement analysis regardless of the
presence (or absence) of funding any time a religious organization claimed excessive regulation. Instead, entanglement analysis is rarely done when government regulates but does not fund
religious organizations. The right question to be asking is
whether the regulatory oversight brought about by the legislation
in question causes government to intrude into that sphere of
activities which the Establishment Clause consigns to religion
and religious organizations. This is the boundary-keeping task of
separating church and state.
The cases bear out that the Supreme Court's sensitivity to
entanglement is proportional to a law's proximity to matters that
are inherently religious. For example, the Court has deemed the
entanglement excessive when the regulation intrudes on inher-

60. Consider, for example, the venerable case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce is regarded as a charter of religious liberty, not only
for the freedom of religious communities to operate religious schools but also
for the freedom of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.
See id. at 535-36. Nonetheless, before acknowledging these freedoms, the Court
in Pierce took care to first stake out the government's power to regulate religious
schools and their teachers, as well as reserve some governmental interests in the
content of what is taught. See id. at 534.
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ently religious matters.6 1 In parallel with this line of cases, when
upholding legislation that exempts religion from a regulatory
burden that would otherwise interfere with inherently religious
matters, the Court has welcomed the exemption as a means of
preventing entanglement from occurring." Conversely, when
the subject being regulated does not touch upon inherently religious matters, the Supreme Court plays down the importance of
entanglement analysis. The Court has thereby found entanglement less than excessive when the legislation being reviewed
addresses commercial, public health, or other matters unrelated
to inherently religious subjects.6 3 In parallel with the foregoing
61.
See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
709 (1976) (holding that courts are without competence to adjudicate
essentially doctrinal disputes for, inter alia,avoidance of entanglement); Rusk v.
Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (mem.), affg 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980)
(striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that required officials to
distinguish between "spiritual" and secular purposes underlying solicitation by
religious organizations).
Until the Supreme Court's inclination in the 1990s to follow the neutrality
principle, the Court viewed the activities of K-12 religious schools as pervasively
religious. Accordingly, the regulation attendant to the funding of such schools
would, in the Court's pre-1990s view, have intruded on inherently religious
matters. Consequently, the cases in the 1970s and 1980s that follow the practice
of intense entanglement analysis when dealing with matters inherently religious
are K-12 religious school cases. See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14; New York v.
Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 132-33 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 254 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1975); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-22 (1971); cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403
(1983) (holding entanglement not excessive when the only governmental task
is review of secular instructional materials); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980) (upholding reimbursement to religious schools of
the cost of state-mandated tests because tests were wholly secular and not part
of regular teaching program, hence entanglement not excessive).
62. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987) (religious
exemption from regulatory burden is permissible legislative means to alleviate
significant governmental interference with ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious mission); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970) (property tax exemption for religious organizations has the
laudable effect of avoiding entanglement when tax authorities evaluate the
worth to the community of faith-based social welfare programs). See also St.
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 787-88
(1981) (construing as unclear a religious exemption in tax legislation in a
manner that broadened the scope of the exemption and thereby avoiding First
Amendment issue administrative entanglement); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501-04 (1979) (desiring to avoid significant risk of
entanglement, Court employed unusual rule of construction that thereby
exempted religious schools from federal regulation).
63. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-18 (1988) (holding that
because faith-based social services are not inherently religious, some regulation
attendant to administration of program does not amount to excessive
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line of cases, when upholding ordinary commercial or labor law
legislation that has no exemption for religious organizations or
practices, the Court may remark that the absence of an exemption is a good thing because it avoids the regulatory entanglement that administering such an exemption would entail.6 4
Entanglement analysis has thus been masking what is really
an inquiry by the Court concerning governmental intrusion (or
lack thereof) into inherently religious matters. The focus on subject matters that are "inherently religious" exists because the
Supreme Court has said that government does not exceed the
restraints of the Establishment Clause unless it is acting on (or
intruding into) such matters.6 5 The Court has found that
prayer,6 6 devotional Bible reading, 67 veneration of the Ten Commandments,6 8 classes in confessional religion,6 9 and the biblical
story of creation presented as science 7' are all inherently relientanglement); Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 305-06 (holding that
regulation of commercial operations of religious organization undertaken for a
commercial purpose does not amount to excessive entanglement); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762-65 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding
that because religious colleges are not pervasively religious, regulatory
entanglement attendant to state funding is not excessive); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 745-49 (1973) (same); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-89
(1971) (same).
64. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989)
(rejecting interpretation of statute requiring the government to distinguish
between secular and religious benefits as fraught with entanglement); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (holding that
uniform application of statute to all religious schools avoids entangling inquiry
by IRS officials); see also Westside Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252-53
(1990) (upholdingEqual Access Act because, inter alia, attempting to exclude
religious speech would create greater entanglement problems); Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (overturning religious
exemption is a laudable rule of law because it reduces possible entanglement);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 n.6, 272 n.11 (1981) (preventing public
university from excluding religious worship or religious speech from designated
public fora is a laudable rule of law because it reduces possible entanglement);
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (employing, whenever possible, neutralprinciples approach to resolve religious disputes avoids entanglement with
religious doctrine, polity, or practice).
65. See, e.g., Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 612-13 (1988) (counseling teenagers to
remain chaste is not an inherently religious activity, even when the counseling
takes place at religious counseling centers).
66. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
67. See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
68. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
69. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
70. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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gious. Hence, by virtue of the Establishment Clause, these topics
are off-limits as objects of legislation or any other purposeful
action by officials. Likewise, when government is called on to
resolve doctrinal questions, or related matters bearing on ecclesiastical polity, clerical office, or church discipline and membership, these subject matters are outside the competence of
government. 7 Finally, the Court has acknowledged as outside
the competence of government issues that involve the meaning
of religious words, practices, and events, 72 as well as questions
concerning the centrality of a particular belief or practice to a
given religion.7 3
Parallel to these case-by-case designations of what is inherently religious is the corollary that the Establishment Clause is
not violated when a legal restriction (or social welfare program)
merely reflects a moral judgment, shared by some religions,
74
about activity thought harmful (or beneficial) to society.
Accordingly, overlap between a law's purpose and rules of morality derived from various well-known religions does not render the
law one "respecting an establishment of religion." Legislation
concerning Sunday closing laws 75 and teenage sexuality counseling,7 6 laws that limit the availability of abortion, 77 and rules on
interracial dating 78 and civil marriage 79 are subject
matters that
the Court has not deemed inherently religious.8" Hence, so far

71. See cases collected supra note 29.
72. See cases collected supra note 28.
73. See cases collected supra note 37.
74. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n.8, 613 (1988) (counseling
of teenagers concerning traditional sexuality not inherently religious); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (tax regulation
prohibiting racial discrimination in education not inherently religious); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (restrictions on abortion not inherently
religious); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 624-30
(1961) (Sunday retail closing law is not inherently religious); Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961) (same);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 43149 (1961) (same); Hennington v.
Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1896) (prohibition on Sunday operation of
trains not inherently religious).
75. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S.
299 (1896).
76. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
77. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
78. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (interracial dating).
79. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-67 (1878)
(antipolygamy law regulates the civil law of marriage).
80. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). Although not referencing the Establishment Clause,
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as the Establishment Clause is concerned, these are appropriate
topics for legislation.
When drawing the Establishment Clause boundary between
government and religion, the Court has not set out to separate
government from all that could be said to be religious. Rather,
the separation is of government from matters inherently religious. A separation of government from all that is arguably religious (or arguably has a religious foundation) would result in a
secular public square, one that is hostile rather than neutral to
the influence of religion on society.8 " The Founders intended
no such regime.8 2 There are extreme voices on the left claiming
that the Establishment Clause established a new secular order,"
it is implicit in Bowers that the Court does not consider the regulation of
intimate sexual relations inherently religious. In Larkin, the Court struck down
an ordinance giving ecclesiastical control over a valuable business license.
Matters of ordinary commerce are not inherently religious, but are subject to
regulation by the states pursuant to their police power.
81. See Westside Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990)
(stating "the message [of the Equal Access Act] is one of neutrality rather than
endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion").
82. Historian Mark A. Noll writes:
[T]he founders' desire for the separation of the institutions of
church and state reflected a desire to respect not only religion but also
the moral choice of citizens. It was not a provision to remove religion
as such from public life. In the context of the times it was more a
device for purifying the religious impact on politics than removing it.
The authors of the [Constitution] seemed to be saying that
religion and politics occupied two different "spheres." This was not
secular in the modern sense. As we have seen, there was every
expectation that Christian principles would continue to play a large
role in strengthening the population and even in providing a moral
context for legislation. Yet the Constitution, without ever spelling it
out precisely, nonetheless still acknowledges that the functions of
government in society have a different role than the functions of
religion. Both are important, and important to each other. But they
are different.
MARK A. NOLL, ONE NATION UNDER GOD? CHRIsTrIAN FAITH AND POLITICAL
AcTION IN AMERICA 67-69 (1988). ,
83. See Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 473, 483-89 (1996) (arguing that secular rationalism is
constitutionally preferred over religion); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 197-214, 222 (1992) (contending that
the First Amendment's negative bar against an establishment of religion implies
an affirmative establishment of a secular public order); see also Gerard V.
Bradley, Church Autonomy in the ConstitutionalOrder: The End of Church and State?,
49 LA. L. REv. 1057, 1059 (1989) (referencing projects born of liberalism, such
as those of John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Richard Rorty, to "privatize"
religion). The multi-century tradition of American politics being rooted in
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one that would thereby force religion into the "private" confines
of home and house of worship. Still others lament that the Court
has promulgated a right to a "freedom from religion."8 4 But the
cases will not support either of these readings. Rather, the Court
has steered a neutral course and properly so.
Various Justices of the Supreme Court, in short statements,
have sought to encapsulate a definition of the boundary between
government and the inherently religious. Justice Brennan wrote
that the common thread in the Court's analysis of whether legislation transgresses the Establishment Clause restraint "is whether
the statutes involve government in the 'essentially religious activities' of religious institutions."8 5 Just a few years earlier, Justice
Harlan expressed the opinion "that where the contested governmental activity is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes
otherwise within the competence of the State, and where the
activity does not involve the State so significantly and directly in
the realm of the sectarian,"8 6 then the restraints of the First
Amendment are not exceeded. As a final example, Justice Frankfurter set the church/state boundary in terms of a structural
restraint on legislative power:
The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of
legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific,
but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief
or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and
man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress may not make these matters, as such, the subject of
87
legislation, nor, now, may any legislature in this country.
contrasting theological persuasions is so well-documented as to make silly
claims such as Sherry's and Sullivan's that the Establishment Clause rendered
religion a force only in the "privacy" of home and church. See, e.g., JAMES L.
GUTH ET AL., THE Bur Y PULPrr: THE POLITICS OF PROTESTANT CLERGY (1997).

84. See Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Religion?, AM. ENTER., Jan.Feb. 1993, at 34, 36.
85. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., concurring).
86. Central Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation omitted).
87. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 465 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the
national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely
religious end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had
done, make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation."); Douglas Laycock,
The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 381 (1992) ("What
the Establishment Clause separates from government is theology, worship, and
ritual, the aspects of religion that relate only to things outside the jurisdiction
of government. Questions of morality, of right conduct, of proper treatment of
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Each of these formulations will do, for they point to the same
basic distinction between subjects that are familiar to the realm
of civic morals and social welfare (hence, appropriate objects of
government legislation) and the inherently religious (hence,
beyond government's legislative power).88
V.

TiHERE Is No

PERSONAL RIGHT AGAINST HAVING ONE'S
TAxEs (PAID INTO GENERAL REVENUES AND LATER
APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS AS PART OF A
NEUTRAL PROGRAM) Go TO A
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

It is all too commonly claimed that federal taxpayers have a
personal right against having their taxes, which are paid into the
nation's general revenue fund, later go to a religious organization.8 9 The claimed "injury" is that, as taxpayers, the plaintiffs
our fellow humans, are questions to which both church and state have
historically spoken.").
88. This approach, of course, unapologetically draws from Western
civilization. I say unapologetically, for there is no other world view the
Founders (specifically, the Congress of 1789-90) could have been relying upon
but that tradition in which they were totally immersed in their day.
A critic might complain that this view of religion, for purposes of the
Establishment Clause, favors Western (or traditional) conceptions of religion.
Others might be expected to complain that the view favors new religious
movements over the historic world religions. Compare Phillip E. Johnson,
Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment ReligiousDoctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817,
834-35 (1984) (nontheistic religious ideologies "could have it both ways" if the
Establishment Clause is applicable only to practices thought inherently
religious by traditional standards) with LAuR cE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTITuTIoNAL LAw § 14-6, at 1187 (2d ed. 1988) (opining that prayer is
religiously significant to most people but preservation of eagle feathers is not;
hence, Establishment Clause permits the government to promote the latter but
not the former). Both complaints have an element of truth. But in drawing a
clear and consistent boundary between church and state-as the Establishment
Clause requires of the Supreme Court-it is impossible to be substantively
neutral. Nor is that the task. Rather, the task is to be true to the text and
meaning of the Establishment Clause, and then to apply this substantive
meaning consistently. That substantive meaning is rooted in Western
civilization as received on this side of the Atlantic. See Clifford Goldstein, The
Theology of a Godless Constitution, LIBERTY, May/June 1998, at 30, 30-31. That
there are those outside the Western tradition displeased with this location of
the church/state boundary is cause for sensitivity and (when prudent)
accommodation; but it is not a reason to relocate that boundary under the
guise of judicial "updating" of the Establishment Clause. Any judicial shifting
of the church/state boundary will just create new grievants, for, again, there is
no substantively neutral location for the boundary between church and state.
89. See, e.g., Derek H. Davis, Equal Treatment: A Christian Separationist
Perspective, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 146-47
(Stephen V. Monsma &J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998).
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(whether religious or nonreligious) have a right not to be
coerced against conscience or to otherwise be "offended" when
general tax revenues are appropriated in support of a neutral
program involving faith-based organizations. 9 ° These claimants
misconceive the law.
The Supreme Court has refused to recognize a federal taxpayer claim of religious coercion or other religious injury. The
plaintiffs in Flast v. Cohen9 1 claimed that payment of a general
federal tax, the monies of which were subsequently appropriated
to, inter alia, faith-based schools, caused them religious coercion
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 9 2 The Flast Court chose
to defer whether that averment stated a claim, indeed whether a
federal taxpayer even had standing to raise a free exercise cause
of action. The Court returned to the issue in Tilton v. Richardson."3 Finding no plausible evidence of compulsion, the Tilton
Court held that a federal taxpayer's cause of action for religious
coercion failed to state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. 94
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United,9 5 claimants
challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause the transfer
90. There is no dispute between no-aid separationists and neutrality
theorists over whether the Establishment Clause prohibits a tax or user fee
specially earmarked for a religious purpose. It does. Justice Thomas in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
noted that history indicates the Founders intended the Establishment Clause to
prevent earmarked taxes for the support of religion. Id. at 853-55, 853-54 n.1
(1995) (ThomasJ., concurring); see also KiryasJoel Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687 (1994) (holding, inter alia, that government may not enact a law that
extends a benefit to a single religious sect as opposed to religion generally).
What is disputed is whether monies collected by general taxation and
appropriated to support a comprehensive welfare program, one that does not
discriminate against the participation of faith-based social service providers, is
violative of the Establishment Clause.
91. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Although passing over the free exercise claim,
Flastwent on to permit federal taxpayer standing to challenge federal spending
as violative of Establishment Clause restraints on congressional power. The
standing allowed in Flast was not for redress of spiritual or religious injury.
Neither was it for individual redress in the form of a tax refund. Rather, the
"pocketbook" injury of a federal taxpayer was a mere surrogate in order that the
Court could entertain a "case or controversy" to correct a structural violation
involving the boundary between government and religion.
92. See id. at 103, 104 n.25.
93. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
94. See id. at 689; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982)
(requiring Amish employer to pay Social Security tax in violation of his
religious beliefs); United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7
(1974) (per curiam) (holding that Quakers, facing federal income tax liability,
did not have a free exercise right that overrode a provision in anti-injunction
act barring claimants from suing to enjoin government from collecting tax).
95. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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of government surplus property to a religious college. Several
asserted bases for standing were all rebuffed by the Court
because the claimants lacked the requisite "injury in fact." One
of the rejected claims was that the Valley Forge plaintiffs had a
"spiritual stake" in not having their government give away property for a religious purpose or to otherwise act in a manner contrary to no-establishment values. The Court rejected that
argument and held that a spiritual stake in having one's government comply
with the Establishment Clause is not a cognizable
96
injury.
As citizens, we are taxed to support with general federal revenues all manner of policies and programs with which we disagree. Tax dollars pay for weapons of mass destruction that some
believe are evil. Taxes pay for abortions and the execution of
capital offenders that others believe are acts of murder by the
government. Taxes pay the salaries of public officials whose policies we despise and oppose at every opportunity. None of these
complaints give rise to constitutionally cognizable "harms" to federal taxpayers. There is no reason that a taxpayer's claim averring "religious coercion" or being "religiously offended" is any
different.
VI.

NEUTRALITY IN

SOCIAL SERVICE BENEFITS IS CONSISTENT

wrrH RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM
REGULATORY BURDENS

Critics have argued that if religious neutrality is the rule of
decision (i.e., "equal treatment" or "evenhandedness" or "nondiscrimination") when it comes to the constitutionality of governmental funding of social service programs, then equal treatment
must also be the rule when it comes to regulatory or tax burdens.9 7 Therefore, they reason, there can-be no religious exemptions from regulatory burdens because any such exemptions
would result in unequal treatment. This is mistaken. The criticism imposes a false symmetry on the operation of the Establishment Clause. The clause does not-nor should it-regard a
96.

See id. at 486 n.22.

97. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable
Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 219, 246-47 (Derek
Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999). Professor Brownstein assumes that religious
exemptions are based on the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 246 n.112. This is not
the case. Rather, religious exemptions are rooted in the structural restraint
imposed on governmental power by the Establishment Clause. As discussed
below (see text accompanying notes 99-107), such exemptions reduce
governmental intrusion into inherently religious matters and, consequently,
expand individual religious choice.
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governmental benefit in the9 8same manner in which the clause
regards a regulatory burden.
When imposing regulatory and tax burdens, the Supreme
Court has held that government may refrain from imposing
these burdens on religion and religious organizations." 9 Thus, it
98. Another false symmetry advanced by scholars is the claim that to
accept neutrality theory as proper Establishment Clause doctrine for analyzing
governmental benefit programs, means that one also has to accept equal
treatment as the proper rule of decision in Free Exercise Clause cases (as the
Court did in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). See, e.g.,
Brownstein, supra note 97, at 247-48; Angela C. Carmella, Everson and Its
Progeny: Separation and Nondiscrimination in Tension, in EvERSON REv srrED:
RELIGION, EDUCATION,

AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS

103, 116-17 (Jo Renie

Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997). This is mistaken. Each religion
clause operates independent of the other. Free Exercise Clause claims are
cognizable only upon a showing of individual religious harm and, after Smith,
only upon a showing of intentional discrimination. A violation of the
Establishment Clause, however, does not require a showing of religious
coercion. The lesson is that the rule of decision in free exercise cases is distinct
and independent from the operation of the Establishment Clause.
99. Corporation of PresidingBishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), is the leading case. Amos upheld a religious
discrimination exemption for religious organizations in federal civil rights
legislation. "[It is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define
and carry out their missions." Id. at 335; see also Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (sustaining constitutionality of statutory
requirement that the religious practices of employees reasonably be
accommodated); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972) (sustaining
constitutionality of requirement that the religious practices of parents of
school-aged children be accommodated); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (religious exemption from military draft for those who oppose all war
does not violate Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (upholding property tax exemption for religious organizations); Arlan's
Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (mem.) (holding that religious
exemption from Sunday Closing Law not violative of Establishment Clause);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding release-time program for
students to be excused from compulsory education law to attend religious
exercises off public school grounds); The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366 (1918) (upholding, inter alia, military service exemptions for clergy and
theology students). The distinction between a benefit (such as a grant) and
lifting a regulatory burden (in the form of a tax exemption), first set out
explicitly in Walz, was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590-91 (1997).
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), is not contrary to the
principle stated in the text. In Thornton, the Court struck down a state law
favoring Sabbath observance for employees working in the private sector. First,
the law conferred a benefit; it was not an exemption from a state-imposed
burden. Second, as explained in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136, 145 n.1l (1987), the Sabbath law in Thornton was struck down because
the state cannot utilize classifications that single out a specific religious
practice, as opposed to language inclusive of a general category of religious
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is now commonplace that religious exemptions from regulatory
burdens do not violate the Establishment Clause.10 0 This is
because to establish a religion connotes that government must
take some affirmative step ("Congress shall make no law ... .") in
furtherance of the prohibited result. Conversely, for government
to passively leave religion "where it found it" logically cannot be a
law respecting an establishment. Professor Laycock stated the
common sense of the matter when he wrote, "The state does not
support or establish religion by leaving it alone."' 1
The
Supreme Court in Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos' °2 made this crucial point
concerning government passivity when it said:
[Religious groups have been better able to advance their
purposes on account of many laws that have passed constitutional muster: for example, the property tax exemption
at issue in Walz .... A law is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion, which is
their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden "effects"
under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself
has advanced religion through its own activities and
influence. 10 3

observances, thereby favoring that particular practice. For example, if Saturday
as a day of rest is legislatively required to be accommodated by employers, all
religious practices (including all religious days of rest) must be required to be
accommodated. If a Kosher diet is required to be accommodated by
commercial airlines, then all religious practices (including all religious dietary
requirements) must be accommodated. If a student absence from school is
excused for Good Friday, then so must absences for all religious holy days be
accommodated. The special needs of national defense make Gillette
distinguishable from Thornton. In Gillette, Congress was permitted to
accommodate "all war" pacifists but not "justwar" inductees because to broaden
the exemption invited increased church/state entanglements and would render
almost impossible the fair and uniform administration of the selective service
system. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450.
100. See, e.g., Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist
Church, 846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of
religious exemption in state licensure of faith-based child care facilities);
Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1974)
(upholding the constitutionality of congressional amendment to Hill-Burton
Act granting exemption to certain practices of faith-based hospitals).
101.
See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1416 (1981).
102. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a religious exemption in Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
103. Id. at 336-37.
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It is not a difficult concept to see that a legislature may elect to
not constrict religious liberty.1" 4 This reduces civic/religious tensions and minimizes governmental intrusion into religious matters, both objectives that help maintain the separate
spheres of
10 5
competence sought by the Establishment Clause.
By sparing individuals of regulatory burdens on their religious practice, the government no more unconstitutionally
favors religion than the Free Exercise Clause unconstitutionally
favors religion. As Justice White reminded us in Welsh v. United
States,106 the Free Exercise Clause is itself a law that by its express
terms exempts religion from certain civic burdens. Laws that
exempt religion from civic duties borne by others-such as the
Free Exercise Clause does-cannot possibly violate the Establishment Clause,
for then the latter clause would cancel out the
10 7
former!

As argued in the foregoing Parts 1-111, neutrality should be
the Supreme Court's operative rule when analyzing participation
in governmental benefit programs. Exemptions from regulatory
burdens and neutrality as to benefits are not inconsistent positions. The common thread is the minimization of governmental
influence over individual religious choices. In following a rule of
neutrality, the equal treatment of religious and nonreligious
providers of social services is not an end in itself. Rather, neutrality is a means to minimizing the government's influence over
personal choices concerning religious beliefs and practices. Minimization is realized when governmental programs are neutral
regarding the individual choices (whether religious or secular)
of the poor and needy served by these programs.
Whether we are pondering the constitutionality of exemptions from regulatory burdens or of neutrality in benefit programs, the integrating principle is to minimize the impact of
104. Amos also makes it clear that for a government to "refrain from
imposing a new burden" is logically no different from "lifting a burden"
imposed in the past. In Amos, a burden first imposed in 1964 was lifted in 1972.
Id. at 329; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
105. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (it is desirable
when government refrains from imposing a burden on religion so as "to
complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the

other").
106. 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
107. A religious exemption may be broader in scope than that required
by the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Amos, it was assumed that the Title
VII exemption might well be broader in scope than that required by the Free
Exercise Clause, and still the Court upheld it. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
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governmental action on individual religious choices."' 8 From
that common baseline,10 9 it makes sense to fully align with the
Supreme Court in cases such as Amos, when it holds that religious
exemptions from legislative burdens are consistent with the
Establishment Clause, and, on the other hand, to align with cases
such as Agostini1 1 ° and Zobrest,11 when they hold that the Establishment Clause permits the equal treatment of religion when it
11 2
comes to government benefit programs.
108. Leaving unimpeded religion and personal religious choice as the
values integrating the Establishment Clause's treatment of regulatory burdens
and social service benefits is not elevated here as good theology, just good
jurisprudence. I say good jurisprudence because religious choice, as a value,
allows each religion to flourish or wither according to its own appeal. Choice as
the controlling legal standard maximizes liberty of both the individual and the
religious community while neutralizing the impact of governmental action on
religion and religious life. In these respects, it is biased toward a Western
conception of individual rights and limited government. This bias, however, is
cause for neither surprise nor apology. It is the Founders' legacy, and they were
decidedly Western.
Good theology is another matter. For observant Jews and Christians,
religious liberty consists not in doing what one chooses but in the liberty to do
what one ought. Religious belief and practice are understood in terms of truth,
not choice. But it should not be troubling that religious choice is a
constitutional value when interpreting the Establishment Clause. There is no
reason that law and theology must converge on this point. It is sufficient that
law affords individuals the freedom to pursue a direction indicated by his or her
theology. This is a matter on which liberalism, upholding the value of
autonomy, and traditional religions, upholding obedience to their God,
converge on the desired end. See John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for
Religious Freedom, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 275, 277, 279, 289-91 (1996).

109. As I shift analysis from benefits to burdens, a critic might complain
that I am moving the baseline from which I measure the constitutionality of the
government's action. Not so. I have drawn a single baseline, one not rooted in
history or the point in time when the legislation is enacied. Rather, the
baseline is rooted in the principle of minimizing government's impact on
religion and personal religious choice. I make no claim that this choice of
baseline is substantively neutral, see supra notes 14, 88, and 108, for there is no
such thing as substantive neutrality in church/state relations. I do claim that it
is the baseline implicit in Amos and Walz, on the one hand, and in neutrality
theory, on the other.
110. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that remedial educational services
provided to students at their religious schools pursuant to neutral
governmental program is not violative of Establishment Clause).
111. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding
that sign language interpreter provided to student in religious school pursuant
to neutral governmental program is not violative of Establishment Clause).
112. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), is
not to the contrary. In Bullock, a three-judge plurality struck down a state sales
tax exemption available on purchases of sacred and other literature
promulgating religious faith as violative of the "secular purpose" requirement
of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 17 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and
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CONCLUSION

No one need apologize for a model of church/state relations that maximizes individual religious choice and organizational autonomy (subject, of course, to the reasonable demands
Stevens, JJ.). Justice White wrote separately because he believed that the law
was a content-based discrimination violative of the Free Press Clause. See id. at
26. Justice Blackmun also wrote separately, joined by Justice O'Connor,
holding narrowly that "a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature
by religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause." Id. at 28.
Portions of the three-judge plurality suggest the unconstitutionality of
religious exemptions from regulatory and tax burdens unless the scope of the
exemption is broadened to include a number of nonreligious groups that
provide similar charitable or beneficent services. See id. at 11-12. I do not think
this states the law. First, the rationale of a three-judge plurality is not
controlling. Plurality opinions of the Supreme Court are not binding on lower
federal and state courts except on the narrow question decided. See, e.g.,
Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (lth Cir. 1998). Indeed,
just one year later a majority of the Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990), invited the unsuccessful litigants to seek religion-specific
exemptions from general regulatory laws by going to the legislature. It would
be disingenuous to commend legislative exemptions as an avenue of relief for
religious claimants if such exemptions were unconstitutional.
Second, the three-judge plurality went out of its way to say that the opinion
was not contrary to two important cases generally upholding religious
exemptions: Corporationof PresidingBishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
See Bullock, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8. The plurality even opined that it would be
constitutional if the U.S. Air Force adopted a religious exemption from the
military's rule on the wearing of official head gear, albeit, such a rule is not
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
Third, at one point the threejudge plurality suggests that the problem with
the exemption is that it was too narrow. See id. at 15 n.5, 16 n.6. The sales tax
exemption favored sacred writings and "writings promulgating the teaching of
the faith," as opposed to all religious writings. A religious exemption can be
unconstitutionally narrow by favoring some religious beliefs or practices over
others. See Kiryas Joel Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-05 (1994)
(striking down a law, inter alia, because it sought to relieve a burden from a
single religious sect); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). See
supra note 99, for a discussion of the Court's explanation of Thornton in Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 n.l1 (1987). If confined to
this issue, the Bullock plurality is consistent with the Court's case law elsewhere.
Fourth, at times the three-judge plurality characterized the sales tax as an
exemption from a tax burden (as was the property tax exemption in Walz) and
at other times as a benefit or subsidy for the purchasers of these materials (see
Bullock, 489 U.S. at 18). If the tax exemption is indeed properly characterized
as a benefit or subsidy, one specially extended to purchasers of religious
materials alone, then I agree that the law is violative of the Establishment
Clause. Such a law would not be a neutral benefit program. Rather, it would be
as if the legislature enacted a social service program that was only available to
faith-based providers. That is not permitted by the Establishment Clause. See
supra note 90.
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of organized society to protect against real and substantial threats
to public health and safety) while restraining the power of the
modern regulatory/welfare state, including limiting the power of
the sovereign's purse to influence religious choice. This combination of individual liberty, institutional autonomy, and limited
government is what the religion clauses of the First Amendment
were designed to promote. After all, it was the First Amendment
that expressly singled out religion as an enduring attribute of the
human condition that called for unique handling. May the
Supreme Court make it so.

